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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case 
Mark Andrew Wing appeals from his judgment of conviction for aggravated 
assault. Prior to sentencing, but after having an opportunity to review his presentence 
investigation report, Mr. Wing moved to withdraw his Alford1 plea, which the district 
court denied. Mr. Wing now appeals, and he asserts that the district court abused its 
discretion when it denied his motion to withdraw his Alford plea. 
Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings 
On July 21, 2009, officers from the Coeur d'Alene police department responded 
to an incident at the Tamarack Trailer Park. (Presentence Investigation Report 
(hereinafter, PSI), p.2.) The park manager reported that Mr. Wing was chasing Aaron 
Fulk with a sword. (PSI, p.2.) The manager stated that Mr. Wing was trying to kill 
Mr. Fulk and would have succeeded had Mr. Fulk not fallen and avoided the sword. 
(PSI, p.2.) Mr. Fulk stated that he had got to Mr. Wing's trailer to confront him about 
how he had been treating Mr. Fulk's brother when the incident occurred. (PSI, p.2.) 
Mr. Fulk received no physical injuries. (PSI, p.3.) 
Mr. Wing was charged with attempted murder in the first degree and obstructing 
a police officer. (R., p.61.) Counsel for Mr. Wing then moved for an evaluation 
pursuant to I.C. §§ 18-210 and 211 in order to determine whether Mr. Wing was 
competent to stand trial. (R., p.73.) The district court ordered the evaluation. 
(R., p.75.) Following the evaluation, Mr. Wing was involuntarily committed to the 
Department of Health and Welfare. (R., p.86.) 
1 North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25 (1970). 
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Once it was determined that Mr. Wing was competent, he proceeded to trial, 
where the district court declared a mistrial. (R., p.164.) Mr. Wing subsequently entered 
into a plea agreement in which he entered an Alford plea to an amended charge of 
aggravated assault. (Tr., p.13, Ls.11-15.) 
Prior to sentencing, Mr. Wing filed a motion to withdraw his plea. (R., p.179.) 
Mr. Wing was appointed new counsel, who informed the court that prior counsel had 
told him that she had "discussed the PSI with Mr. Wing but that he did not have an 
opportunity to fully review it." (Tr., p.27, Ls.9-15.) 
Mr. Wing then testified at the hearing on his motion. He stated that he wished to 
withdraw his plea because he believed that he was not guilty of the crime. (Tr., p.30, 
Ls.11-13.) He also believed that his prior counsel did not investigate the case properly. 
He testified that he gave his attorney and her investigator a list of people and witnesses 
to contact and they told him that some of them they could not find and others would not 
be witnesses for him. (Tr., p.30, Ls.16-25.) 
One of these witnesses was a reverend that was a neighbor of his, and his 
attorney stated that they had contact him and he stated that he would testify that he was 
reeking of alcohol and was drunk. (Tr., p.31, Ls.1-3.) Mr. Wing subsequently contacted 
this witness, who did not even know who his attorney was, so Mr. Wing knew that she 
actually had not contacted that witness. (Tr., p.32, Ls.3-7.) Mr. Wing testified that had 
his attorney actually contacted this witness and learned what he would testify about, he 
would not have entered his Alford plea. (Tr., p.32, Ls.11-16.) 
On cross-examination, Mr. Wing acknowledged that, when he entered his Alford 
plea, he maintained that he was not guilty of the crime. (Tr., p.33, Ls.8-11.) Regarding 
what he knew about the PSI at the time he filed his motion to withdraw his plea, 
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Mr. Wing stated that he got in "hours before I came into court" and that his attorney 
"didn't really go into anything. She just said she wasn't happy with it. That's all she 
said." (Tr., p.34, L.19 - p.35, L.3.) When asked why the reverend was not present to 
testify, Mr. Wing stated that he hadn't been able to call him. (Tr., p.37, L.1.) 
The district court denied the motion to withdraw the plea. (Tr., p.45, Ls.9-10.) 
The court noted that it had not heard any testimony from the reverend. (Tr., p.45, Ls.9-
20.) The court held that "the fact that Mr. Wing doesn't feel he's guilty isn't a valid 
reason at least not at this point in time." (Tr., p.46, Ls.8-10.) The court stated, "I don't 
have the reverend's testimony. I don't have [trial counsel's) testimony. I don't have [the 
investigator's) testimony, so I don't have any good basis for the reason, let alone any 
proof that it's a just reason. (Tr., p.46, Ls.13-16.) The court also noted that an 
enhancement was dropped in the plea agreement and, therefore, "there is no way that 
allowing a withdrawal of the guilty plea would inure to Mr. Wing's benefit." (Tr., p.47, 
Ls.1-5.) 
The case proceeded to sentencing, where the district court imposed a unified 
sentence of five years, with four years fixed. (R., p.189.) Mr. Wing appealed, and he 




Did the district court abuse its discretion when it denied Mr. Wing's motion to withdraw 
his Alford plea? 
4 
ARGUMENT 
The District Court Abused Its Discretion When It Denied Mr. Wing's Motion To Withdraw 
His Alford Plea 
A. Introduction 
After he entered his Alford plea, but prior to sentencing, Mr. Wing moved to 
withdraw his plea. The district court denied Mr. Wing's motion. Mr. Wing asserts that 
the district court abused its discretion by denying his motion to withdraw his Alford plea. 
B. The District Court Abused Its Discretion When It Denied Mr. Wing's Motion To 
Withdraw His Alford Plea 
A motion to withdraw a guilty plea is generally governed by the provisions of 
I.C.R. 33(c), which provides that such a motion, "may be made only before sentence is 
imposed or imposition of sentence is suspended; but to correct manifest injustice the 
court after sentence may set aside the judgment of conviction and permit the defendant 
to withdraw the defendant's plea." I.C.R. 33(c). The district court's decision whether to 
grant a defendant's motion to withdraw his or her guilty plea is reviewed on appeal for 
an abuse of discretion. See, e.g., State v. Arthur, 145 Idaho 219, 222 (2008). However, 
the district court must act within the proper bounds of that discretion and consistent with 
the legal standards that are applicable to its determination. State v. Warren, 135 Idaho 
836, 839 (Ct. App. 2001 ). The district court should liberally apply its discretion when 
presented with a motion to withdraw the defendant's guilty plea prior to sentencing. 
Arthur, 145 Idaho at 222. 
The legal standards governing the district court's review of a defendant's motion 
to withdraw a guilty plea depend upon the timing of the defendant's motion. Id. When 
the defendant makes the motion prior to sentencing, he or she need only show "just 
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cause" to withdraw the plea. Id. Before sentencing, the inconvenience to the court and 
prosecution resulting from a change of plea is ordinarily slight as compared to protecting 
the right of the accused to trial by jury. State v. Hanslovan, 147 Idaho 530 (Ct. App. 
2008). A district court may deny such a motion where the defendant fails to present and 
support a plausible reason for the withdrawal. State v. Wyatt, 131 Idaho 95, 97 
(Ct. App. 1998). Denial is also proper where the state demonstrates that it would be 
prejudiced by the withdrawal of the guilty plea. Id. 
Additionally, special considerations are permitted when the defendant's motion to 
withdraw comes before sentencing, but after the defendant has had the opportunity to 
review the content of the presentence investigation report. In such cases, the district 
court "may temper its liberality by weighing the defendant's apparent motive." Arthur, 
145 Idaho at 222. 
In contrast, a much stricter standard applies when the defendant moves to 
withdraw his or her guilty plea after sentencing. In such cases, a defendant must 
demonstrate manifest injustice in order to be entitled to a witHdrawal of the plea. 
State v. Shook, 144 Idaho 858, 859 (Ct. App. 2007). Manifest injustice is established if 
the plea was not taken in compliance with the due process requirements that the plea 
be made knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily. Id. 
While the first step in analyzing a defendant's motion to withdraw a guilty plea is 
to examine whether the plea is constitutionally valid, this is not the last or necessarily 
dispositive analysis when the defendant's motion is made prior to sentencing. State v. 
Rodriguez, 118 Idaho 957, 959 (Ct. App. 1990). Even if the plea itself is constitutionally 
valid, tl1e district court is required to consider whether the reasons for seeking 
withdrawal of the guilty plea meet the lesser standard of just cause. Id. 
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In this case, the record discloses that Mr. Wing's trial counsel told him that she 
was not happy with the PSI, but that Mr. Wing did not actually have a full opportunity to 
review it. (Tr., p.34, L.19 - p.35, L.3.) Therefore, Mr. Wing need only show "just cause" 
to withdraw his plea. Mr. Wing asserts that he demonstrated that his plea was not 
knowing, intelligently, or voluntarily given because the plea was made without him 
knowing that counsel did not contact his neighbor, the reverend. Mr. Wing was 
specifically told that his witness would not provide favorable testimony and Mr. Wing 
testified that he learned this was not true, and that but for that fact, he would not have 
entered his plea. While the district court is correct that it did not hear testimony from the 
reverend or from Mr. Wing's trial attorney and investigator, Mr. Wing testified to these 
facts and his testimony was uncontroverted by the State. The only evidence before the 
district court was Mr. Wing's testimony, which the State did not contradict. Mr. Wing 
therefore submits that his uncontroverted testimony that his attorney did not contact a 
favorable witness supplied a "just cause" for him to withdraw his Alford plea. 
Finally, while the district court stated that was "not much of a factor" in its 
decision, the court noted that "there is no way that allowing a withdrawal of the plea 
would inure to Mr. Wing's benefit." (Tr., p.47, Ls.3-5.) Mr. Wing submits that this should 
not be a factor at all. First, withdrawal of the plea would certainly be in Mr. Wing's 
interest if he were to be found not guilty at trial. Second, whether the district court 
perceives the plea agreement to be a good deal is not a consideration. Mr. Wing is 
entitled to withdraw his plea if the plea was not knowingly, intelligently, or voluntarily 
given or if he shows "just cause," regardless of whether the district court, which was not 
a party to the negotiations, perceives the agreement to be in the defendant's interest. 
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CONCLUSION 
Mr. Wing requests that the district court's order denying his motion to withdraw 
his Alford plea be reversed and his case remanded for further proceedings. 
DATED this 30th day of September, 2011. 
JUSTIN M>q~RTIS 
Deputy Stctte )\ppellate Public Defender 
'~ 
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